Satellite Hardening Aff UM 7wk - Open Evidence Archive

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1ac - Plan The United States federal government should defensively harden satellites
used by our military. 1ac - Heg Space weaponization and conflict is inevitable
Kitfield 10-Senior Correspondent @ The National Journal, writer for Air
Force Magazine, B.A. Journalism, University of Georgia, distinguished
writer on defense, national security, and foreign policy, author of two
books on national security, [James, Air Force Magazine, "Crowded Congested
Space" August 2010, http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810space.aspx] In the "commons" above Earth, US military forces must deal with junk and
potential predators. Last year, an Iridium communications satellite
unexpectedly went dead. US military space analysts soon discovered it had
smashed into a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, a collision that destroyed
both spacecraft and created a large and dangerous debris field in space.
That incident followed another worrisome event. In January 2007, China
successfully tested an anti-satellite missile against one of its own
defunct satellites. That attack, a direct hit, created 150,000 pieces of
space clutter-not all of it even visible to US space operators. Both events
reveal that the global commons of space-which the United States has long
dominated and has increasingly used as leverage to achieve a decisive
military edge-is increasingly crowded and contested. There have been years
of warnings that US space dominance is in peril. It is now safe to assume
that, in a future war, the military will not have unhindered access to the
space-based capabilities that create numerous US combat advantages.
Potential adversaries aren't just aware of how heavily the US relies on
space. They already have the means to compete and to challenge US
operations there. Today, many commanders view space dominance as vital to
warfare in the Information Age. "Certainly in the air world, in the ISR
[intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance] world, and most especially in
the space world, [there is] competition out there, [and the] competition is
getting better," said Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, commander of 14th Air Force
at Vandenberg AFB, Calif. "Multiple nation-states now have space launch
capability, have ISR capability, [and] have intelligence capability from
space, so we've got to continue to raise our game to make sure we are still
the best." As a recent report by the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS) noted, it is increasingly clear that a military able to effectively
use space has tremendous advantages through rapid globe-spanning
communications, broad and sophisticated surveillance and intelligence-
gathering capability, and accurate force positioning, operations timing,
and precision targeting abilities. "Put in military terms, the space
commons offers distinct and significant advantages in command, control,
communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR),
maneuverability, and firepower," noted report author Eric Sterner. "As the
United States has been the world's leading innovator in the use of space
for military purposes, this development is largely a story of American
innovation." Given the game-changing advantages that the United States
reaps from its dominance of space, it was inevitable that other countries
would also seek to exploit space for their own uses, both military and
commercial. Today, nine countries, plus the European Space Agency member
states, have the ability to independently place satellites into orbit, and
virtually any country or nonstate actor can access satellite technology by
buying time on commercial satellites. As the US military's dependence on
space systems has grown exponentially in recent years, however, so has a
growing sense of unease among military commanders concerned about the
vulnerability of those assets. In 2001, the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization released a
report that predicted that future warfare in space was a "virtual
certainty," and it proposed that the United States [should] begin to
develop the means both to deter and defend against attacks on its space
assets, and to mount offensive operations to deny the use of space to
potential adversaries. To do otherwise, the commission warned, would invite
a "space Pearl Harbor." US officials confirmed in 2006 that China had
successfully "painted" a US satellite with a laser. China's January 2007
test of the direct-ascent, anti-satellite SC-19 missile greatly heightened
those concerns. And a recent Pentagon report on China's military
modernization revealed that China is developing other anti-satellite
systems, to include ground-based lasers designed to blind sensitive
satellite optics. China is also reportedly developing microsatellites
crafted to act as "space mines," which could loiter in space until given
the signal to destroy other satellites. At present, US officials say they
are uncertain whether China has already launched such "parasite"
satellites. "In today's world, ... there are a lot of folks launching a lot
of satellites, some of them very small," and we have a lot of work to do in
terms of knowing "what their mission is, ... what the intent of the owner
is," and whether they represent a threat, said James. That really gets into
the intelligence world more than the tracking world, but, "frankly, we have
a long way to go" in achieving that space situational awareness. According
to the CNAS report, China has identified American dependence on space as an
asymmetric vulnerability to exploit. "China is developing robust
capabilities to operate in space and deny its adversaries the use of space
during a time of crisis or conflict," the report concluded. The brink is now-US satellites are at risk of ASAT attacks and assets have
no defensive capabilites
Schendzielos, 8 - major in the USAF, School of Advanced Military Studies
(April 30, 2008, Major Kurt Schendzielos, "Protection in Space: A Self-
Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites", http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA485553)
On balance, the need to develop satellite self-defense capabilities is
clear. Two adversarial nations have demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic-
kill ASAT capability. Several more have ground-based laser ASAT technology
capable of dazzling, blinding, and even potentially destroying U.S.
satellites. China has shown an inclination toward developing a wide array
of ASAT technologies to disrupt U.S. space capability on a variety of
fronts. China has also taken fairly provocative steps in their march toward
testing their emerging ASAT programs: "amid concerns from military analysts
wondering why Chinese spacecraft are in orbits that bring them within close
proximity of key U.S. satellites, according to Air Force Times, February 2,
2007. The Chinese spacecraft do not appear to be conducting any particular
mission and that has analysts worried. The satellites could be identifying
the capabilities and mission of American space platforms, attempting to
intercept their communications with ground-based receiver stations, or
placed in position to explode or impact a U.S. satellite in times of war.
"There is a menu of missions that could be performed that we are not yet
clear about," one unidentified source told the industry magazine. "These
things aren't being sent up there to be space rocks," the source
cautioned."168 Unfortunately, as Secretary of the Air Force Wynne laments,
"Currently all U.S. satellites reside 'in peaceful mode' on orbit, meaning
they are not 'well defended"169 The U.S. has been able to rest comfortably
with the knowledge that space represented a relative sanctuary. "The U.S.
strategy for space control over the past decade has relied largely on non-
destructive measures and the capability for terrestrial systems to disable
ground based command and control stations or launch facilities. These
measures have sufficed until now because of the relatively primitive state
of potential U.S. adversaries' systems and the paucity of their command and
control links."170 That situation is quickly changing. Provocative acts
have already been taken and unambiguous moves are being taken by
adversaries today. The only prospect facing the U.S. is that more ASAT
technology will proliferate to adversary nations as time marches on. The
time to provide widespread defense to all critical U.S. security related
satellites (both civil and military) is now. The acquisition timelines
associated with major program improvements range from approximately two
years for Commercial Off-the-Shelf or Rapid Fielding Initiative programs to
ten to fifteen years for major force programs like the F-22 or Future
Combat Systems. If the U.S. is to respond to threats against U.S. space
presence in the near future, efforts must be made now. Budgets must
increase, priorities set, and resources allocated to reflect the renewed
efforts to develop an adequate defense in time to protect against ASAT
attacks. Another reality is that program costs generally increase as time
goes on. While any one single technology will become cheaper over time as
it becomes more widely available and easier to manufacture, program
development continues to become more expensive because of the pace of
technological advances that have to be included in order to remain
relevant. Inflation also plays a role in making programs more costly over
time, thusly using more national resources in order to achieve a similar
effect. Waiting one or several years to decide if developing satellite
defense is a high enough priority to warrant additional resources will
cause more resources to have to be spent in the long run. All in all, the
time to act is now. 59 And, the U.S. is heavily dependent on its vulnerable space a