CR_JUDG.doc

IMMANUEL KANT:
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (1790),
trans. by J. H. Bernard, 2nd edition revised (London: Macmillan, 1914). Text is in the public domain. This copy downloaded from: http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/HTML.php?recordID=0318 3-27-2006: Approximate page references (from the Table of Contents) set to
match the 2nd edition). Word document pagination inserted for convenience. From
Table of Contents xiii EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
xxxvi Endnotes
xxxvi GLOSSARY OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS 3 PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
7 I. OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
10 II. OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL
12 III. OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AS A MEANS OF
COMBINING THE TWO PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO A WHOLE.
15 IV. OF JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING A PRIORI
17 V. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS OF
NATURE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDGEMENT.
23 VI. OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH
THE CONCEPT OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
25 VII. OF THE AESTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.
29 VIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE
32 IX. OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF
UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF REASON BY MEANS OF THE
JUDGEMENT PART I
CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
FIRST DIVISION ANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT # FIRST BOOK ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL FIRST MOMENT OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE
ACCORDING TO QUALITY
37 § 1. The judgement of taste is aesthetical
38 § 2. The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is
disinterested
39 § 3. The satisfaction in the PLEASANT is bound up with
interest
41 § 4. The satisfaction in the GOOD is bound up with interest
43 § 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of
satisfaction
EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM
THE FIRST MOMENT
SECOND MOMENT
OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, VIZ. ACCORDING TO
QUANTITY
45 § 6. The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is
represented as the object of a universal satisfaction
46 § 7. Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good
by means of the above characteristic
48 § 8. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a
judgement of Taste only as subjective
51 § 9. Investigation of the question whether in the judgement of
taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the
judging
of the object
OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE SECOND MOMENT THIRD MOMENT OF JUDGEMENTS OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE RELATION OF THE
WHICH ARE BROUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION THEREIN.
54 § 10. Of purposiveness in general
56 § 11. The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form
of the purposiveness of an object ( or of its mode of
representation)
57 § 12. The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds
58 § 13. The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and
emotion
59 § 14. Elucidation by means of examples
62 § 15. The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept
of perfection
65 § 16. The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to
be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is
not
pure
68 § 17. Of the Ideal of beauty EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL DERIVED FROM THIS THIRD MOMENT FOURTH MOMENT
OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE MODALITY OF THE
IN THE OBJECT
73 § 18. What the modality in a judgement of taste is
74 § 19. The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the
judgement of taste, is conditioned
74 § 20. The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste
asserts is the Idea of a common sense
75 § 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?
76 § 22. The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in
a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is
represented as objective under the presupposition of a
common sense EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FOURTH 76 GENERAL REMARK ON THE FIRST SECTION OF THE ANALYTIC SECOND BOOK ANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME
82 § 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to
that which judges of the Sublime
85 § 24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the
sublime
A. Of the Mathematically Sublime
86 § 25. Explanation of the term 'sublime'
89 ? 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which
is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime
96 § 27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon
the Sublime
B. Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature
99 § 28. Of Nature regarded as Might
104 § 29. Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in
nature 106 GENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE AESTHETICAL
JUDGEMENT
DEDUCTION OF [PURE] AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENTS
120 § 30. The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of
nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in
nature, but only to the Beautiful.
122 § 31. Of the method of deduction of judgements of Taste
123 § 32. First peculiarity of the judgement of Taste
125 § 33. Second peculiarity of the judgement of Taste
127 § 34. There is no objective principle of Taste possible
128 § 35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of
Judgement in general
130 § 36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste
131 § 37. What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a
judgement of Taste
132 § 38. Deduction of judgements of Taste
Remark
133 § 39. Of the communicability of a Sensation
135 § 40. Of Taste as a kind of sensus communis
138 § 41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful
140 § 42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful
145 § 43. Of Art in general
147 § 44. Of beautiful Art
149 § 45. Beautiful Art is an art, in so far as it seems like nature
150 § 46. Beautiful Art is the art of genius
151 § 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of
Genius
153 § 48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste
156 § 49. Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius
163 § 50. Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of
beautiful Art
164 § 51. Of the division of the beautiful arts
169 § 52. Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same
product
170 § 53. Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the
beautiful arts
175 § 54. Remark SECOND DIVISION DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT
182 § 55.
183 § 56. Representation of the antinomy of Taste
184 § 57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste
Remark I.
Remark II.
192 § 58. Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as
the
unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement.
196 § 59. Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality 200 § 60. APPENDIX Of the method of Taste
PART II CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT 205 § 61. Of the objective purposiveness of Nature FIRST DIVISION
OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT 208 § 62. Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as
distinguished from that which is material
212 § 63. Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner,
purposiveness of
nature
216 § 64. Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes
218 § 65. Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings
222 § 66. Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in
organised
beings
224 § 67. Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in
general as
a system of purposes
228 § 68. Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science SECOND DIVISION
OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT 232 § 69. What is an antinomy of the Judgement?
233 § 70. Representation of this antinomy
235 § 71. Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy
236 § 72. Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of
nature
239 § 73. None of the above systems give what they pretend
243 § 74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of
nature
dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable
245 § 75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a
critical
principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement
249 § 76. Remark
253 § 77. Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of
which the concept of a natural purpose is possible
258 § 78. Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of
matter
with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature.
APPENDIX METHODOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT. 265 § 79. Whether teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the
doctrine
of nature
266 § 80. Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the
teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a
natural
purpose.
271 § 81. Of the association of mechanism with the teleological
principle in
the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product.
274 § 82. Of the teleological system in the external relations of
organised
beings
279 § 83. Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system
284 § 84. Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of
creation
itself
286 § 85. Of Physico-theology
292 § 86. Of