Riverlocks neg - Open Evidence Archive

Notes
The main problem with this AFF is that it claims a lot of internal links
that it does not fully access. These become obvious if you look into the
evidence. Putting pressure on the internal links and then punishing them
when the 2AC tries to answer Case arguments with card extensions as you can
point out in the block that the cards they extended say nothing. Also if
you win an econ impact you can logically access EVERY other advantage- for
this reason I put the downgrade DA on case and a card of impact D to
economic war- the ideal scenario(the econ advantage is also the hardest for
them to defend/weakest adv.) is that they concede the impact D leaving an
econ impact that you can use to access all the ADVs. Another consideration is that they think they have a silver bullet to the
states CP(the army corps jurisdiction argument) However the plan mechanism
is fund as is the CP mechanism so there is no reason the CP doesn't solve
100%. The security K also is a useful strategy as combined with heavy case
mitigation it shouldn't be too challenging to prove all of their scenarios
are constructed. Also pretty strong links to HEG/Compet/econ. Additionally there are case turns on the competiveness
advantage(competiveness leads to protectionism) 2NR strats- Security+Case, Politics +Case/CP, Competiveness Turns/Econ
turns +CP
CX
To set up CP-If the Army Corps is the only one who can do the plan why can
the USFG fund the plan Coal- Why couldn't we import steel? The second card of the coal advantage
says "Steel production worldwide has almost doubled"
Coal- Why couldn't we import coal? The second card of the coal advantage
says "The well-supplied world market means that metallurgical coal can be
delivered worldwide" Food- Why didn't the CCP collapse during any one of the food crises during
the past century? i.e. great leap forward
Food- Why would china not being able to buy soybeans affect grain prices? Econ- Why didn't the last recession trigger a global nuclear war?
Econ- Why would the time for the re-building of the waterways be any
different from the failure and rebuild of a system? Competiveness: The panzer card assumes TOTAL isolationism and protectionism
1NC Security 1NC The affirmative's obsession with ranking and managing risk is the essence
of security logic
Hagmann & Cavelty, 2012 (National risk registers: Security scientism and
the propagation of permanent insecurity, John Hagmann and Myriam Dunn
Cavelty, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Sage Journals Feb 15
2012)
With the demise of communism as an overarching organizing principle and
crystallization point, Western security doctrines have seen the
inclusion of a growing range of different security issues from
political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. By the same
token, Western security politics has also been prominently infused with
risk narratives and logics since the 1990s (Petersen, 2011; Hameiri and
Kühn, 2011). Particular to risk-centric conceptualizations of public
danger is the understanding that national and international security
should take into account a varied set of natural or man-made disaster
potentials, as well as other probable disruptions with potentially grave
consequences for society. Also, specific to these dangers is the
profound uncertainty regarding their exact form and likely impact, and
the substantial room for conflicting interpretations surrounding them.
However, precise and 'actionable' knowledge of looming danger is
quintessential to security politics, the shift to new security
narratives notwithstanding. Without conceptions of existing or upcoming
collective dangers, security schemes are neither intelligible nor
implementable. Whether the matter at hand concerns the installation of
hi-tech body scanners at airports, the construction of avalanche
barriers in the Alps or diplomatic initiatives for a global anti-terror
alliance, any security agenda is rhetorically and politically grounded
in a representation of national or international danger. In recent
years, the epistemological foundations of security politics have been
addressed by reflexive and critical approaches, a literature that
enquires into the formation, contestation and appropriation of
(in)security discourses. Situating itself in this broader literature,
this article focuses on national risk registers as a particular means
for authoritative knowledge definition in the field of national
security. National risk registers are fairly recent, comprehensive
inventories of public dangers ranging from natural hazards to industrial
risks and political perils. Often produced by civil protection agencies,
they seek to provide secure foundations for public policymaking,
security-related resource allocation and policy planning. Evaluating and
ranking all kinds of potential insecurities, from toxic accidents and
political unrest to plant diseases, thunderstorms, energy shortages,
terrorist strikes, wars and the instability of global financial markets,
risk registers stand at the intersection of the broadening of security
politics and the adoption of risk logics. In particular, infrastructure development is the essence of modern
securitization - it translates the normal function of life into the
discourse of security
Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 10 (Tom Lundborg, The Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, Nick Vaughan-Williams, University of Warwick,
"There's More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience
Planning, and Molecular Security," Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference,
Stockholm, 7-10 September, 2010)
While the terrain of security studies is of course fiercely contested,
what is common among a range of otherwise often diverse perspectives
is the core premise that 'security' relates to a realm of activity in
some sense beyond the 'norm' of political life. Thus, in the language of
the Copenhagen School, a securitizing move occurs when an issue not
previously thought of as a security threat comes to be produced as
such via a speech act that declares an existential threat to a
referent object (Buzan et al 1998). A similar logic can be identified in
approaches to security that focus on exceptionalism: the idea,
following the paradigmatic thought of Carl Schmitt, that sovereign
practices rely upon the decision to suspend the normal state of affairs
in order to produce emergency conditions in which extraordinary
measures-such as martial law, for example-are legitimised. For this
reason, a tendency in security studies-even among self-styled
'critical' approaches - is to privilege analysis of high-profile 'speech
acts' of elites, 'exceptional' responses to 'exceptional'
circumstances, and events that are deemed to be 'extraordinary'.
Arguably this leads to an emphasis on what we might call the 'spectacle
of security', rather than more mundane, prosaic, and 'everyday' aspects
of security policy and practice. By contrast, the world of CIs
necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away from the
'spectacular' to the 'banal'. Instead of high-profile speech-based acts
of securitization, we are here dealing with telecommunications and
transportation networks, water treatment and sewage works, and so on:
'semi-invisible' phenomena that are often taken-for-granted fixtures and
fittings of society, yet vital for the maintenance of what is considered
to be 'normal daily life'. For this reason our subject matter calls for
a re-thinking of the very 'stuff' considered to be apposite for the
study of international security. Indeed, analysing the role of CIs and
resilience planning in global security relations adds particular
resonance to existing calls within the literature to broaden and deepen
the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualised (Bigo 2002;
Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). Those adopting more
sociologically-oriented perspectives, for example, have sought to
emphasise the way in which securitizing moves can be made by
institutions (as well as individuals), through repeated activity (as
well as one-off 'acts'), and involve various media (not only 'speech',
but visual culture, for example). From this reconfigured point of view
it is possible to then see how the design, planning, management, and
execution of CIs also constitute an arena in which processes of
securitization-of physical and cyber networks-takes place. Security 1NC The dream of security produces apocalypse- constructions of existential
risk produce the annihilation they are meant to escape
Pever Coviello, Prof. of English @ Bowdoin, 2k [Queer Frontiers, p. 39-40]
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively
postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way
postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go
away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear
age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone
and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase)
"remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear
world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local.
In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction
it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very
presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion,
threatening th