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U.S. Supreme Court
JOHNSON v. ROBISON, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) 415 U.S. 361
JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS, ET AL. v. ROBISON.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS.
No. 72-1297. Argued December 11, 1973.
Decided March 4, 1974.
Appellee, who had been exempted from military service as a Class I-O
conscientious objector but who performed required alternative civilian
service, after being denied educational benefits under the Veterans'
Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, brought this class action for a
declaratory judgment that the provisions of the Act making him and his
class ineligible for such benefits violated the First Amendment's guarantee
of religious freedom and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. After denying appellants' motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction because of 38 U.S.C. 211 (a), which prohibits judicial
review of decisions of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on any
question of law or fact under laws administered by the Veterans'
Administration providing for veterans' benefits, the District Court
rejected appellee's First Amendment claim but sustained the Fifth Amendment
claim. Held:
1. Section 211 (a) does not extend to actions challenging the
constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation but is aimed at
prohibiting review only of those decisions of law or fact arising in
the administration of a statute providing for veterans' benefits, and
hence is inapplicable to this action, neither the text of the statute
nor its legislative history showing a contrary intent. Pp. 366-374.
2. The challenged sections of the Act do not create an arbitrary
classification in violation of appellee's right to equal protection of
the laws. Pp. 374-383.
(a) The quantitative and qualitative distinctions between the
disruption caused by military service and that caused by alternative
civilian service - military service involving a six-year commitment
and far greater loss of personal freedom, and alternative civilian
service involving only a two-year obligation and no requirement to
leave civilian life - form a rational basis for Congress'
classification limiting educational benefits to military service
veterans [415 U.S. 361, 362] as a means of helping them to readjust
to civilian life. Pp. 378-382.
(b) The statutory classification also bears a rational relationship to
the Act's objective of making military service more attractive. P.
382.
3. The Act does not violate appellee's right of free exercise of
religion. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 . Pp. 383-386.
(a) The withholding of educational benefits to appellee and his class
involves only an incidental burden, if any burden at all, upon their
free exercise of religion. P. 385.
(b) Appellee and his class were not included as beneficiaries, not
because of any legislative design to interfere with their free
exercise of religion, but because to include them would not rationally
promote the Act's purposes. P. 385.
(c) The Government's substantial interest in raising and supporting
armies, Art. I, 8, is of "a kind and weight" clearly sufficient to
sustain the challenged legislation. Pp. 385-386.
352 F. Supp. 848, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 386.
Gerald P. Norton argued the cause for appellants. On the brief were
Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Harriet S.
Shapiro, Morton Hollander, and William Kanter.
Michael David Rosenberg argued the cause for appellee. With him on the
brief were Charles R. Nesson and Matthew Feinberg. *
[ Footnote * ] Donald S. Burris filed a brief for the National
Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors as amicus curiae
urging affirmance.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
A draftee accorded Class I-O conscientious objector status and completing
performance of required alternative [415 U.S. 361, 363] civilian service
1 does not qualify under 38 U.S.C. 1652 (a) (1) as a "veteran who . . .
served on active duty" (defined in 38 U.S.C. 101 (21) as "full-time duty in
the Armed Forces"), and is therefore not an "eligible veteran" entitled
under 38 U.S.C. 1661 (a) to veterans' educational benefits provided by the
Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. 2 Appellants, the Veterans'
[415 U.S. 361, 364] Administration and the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs, for that reason, denied the application for educational assistance
of appellee Robison, a conscientious objector who filed his application
after he satisfactorily completed two years of alternative civilian service
at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston. Robison thereafter commenced
this class action 3 in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, seeking a declaratory judgment that 38 U.S.C. 101 (21), 1652
(a) (1), and 1661 (a), read together, violated the First Amendment's
guarantee of religious freedom and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. 4 Appellants moved to dismiss the action on the
[415 U.S. 361, 365] ground, among others, that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction because of 38 U.S.C. 211 (a) which prohibits judicial review
of decisions of the Administrator. 5 The District Court denied the motion,
and, on the merits, rejected appellee's First Amendment claim, but
sustained the equal protection claim and entered a judgment declaring "that
38 U.S.C. 1652 (a) (1) and 1661 (a) defining `eligible veteran' and
providing for entitlement to educational assistance are unconstitutional
and that 38 U.S.C. 101 (21) defining `active duty' is unconstitutional with
respect to chapter 34 of Title 38, United States Code, 38 U.S.C. 1651-1697,
conferring Veterans' Educational Assistance, for the reason that said
sections deny plaintiff and members of his class due process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States .
. . ." 352 F. Supp. 848, 862 (1973). 6 We postponed [415 U.S. 361, 366]
consideration of the question of jurisdiction in light of 211 (a) to the
hearing on the merits, and set the case for oral argument with No. 72-700,
Hernandez v. Veterans' Administration, post, p. 391. 411 U.S. 981 (1973). 7
We hold, in agreement with the District Court, that 211 (a) is inapplicable
to this action and therefore that appellants' motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter was properly denied. On the merits, we
agree that appellee's First Amendment claim is without merit but disagree
that 1652 (a) (1), 1661 (a), and 101 (21) violate the Fifth Amendment and
therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court. I We consider first appellants' contention that 211 (a) bars federal courts
from deciding the constitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation. Such
a construction would, of course, raise serious questions concerning the
constitutionality of 211 (a), 8 and in such case "it is a [415 U.S. 361,
367] cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
[constitutional] question[s] may be avoided." United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
Plainly, no explicit provision of 211 (a) bars judicial consideration of
appellee's constitutional claims. That section provides that "the decisions
of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for
veterans . . . shall be final and conclusive and no . . . court of the
United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision
. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The prohibitions would appear to be aimed at
review only of those decisions of law or fact that arise in the
administration by the Veterans' Administration of a statute providing
benefits for veterans. A decision of law or fact "under" a statute is made
by the Administrator in the interpretation or application of a particular
provision of the statute to a particular set of facts. Appellee's
constitutional challenge is not to any such decision of the Administrator,
but rather to a decision of Congress to create a statutory class entitled
to benefits that does not include I-O conscientious objectors who performed
alternative civilian service. Thus, as the District Court stated: "The
questions of law presented in these proceedings arise under the
Constitution, not under the statute whose validity is challenged." 352 F.
Supp., at 853.
This construction is also supported by the administrative practice of the
Veterans' Administration. "When faced with a problem of statutory
construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given
the [415 U.S. 361, 368] statute by the officers or agency charged with
its administration." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The Board of
Veterans' Appeals expressly disclaimed authority to decide constitutional
questions in Appeal of Sly, C-27 593 725 (May 10, 1972). There the Board,
denying a claim for educational assistance by a I-O conscientious objector,
held that "[t]his decision does not reach the issue of the
constitutionality of the pertinent laws as this matter is not within the
jurisdiction of this Board." Sly thus accepts and follows the principle
that "[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments
has ge