Foucault K UM 7wk - Open Evidence Archive

Foucault K
1NC 1 ***ALTERNATIVES 4
Alt Slv 5
Criticize 6
Reject 9
Resistance 10 ***LINKS 10
Generic Links 10
L- Cap 13
L- Econ 14
L- GPS 15
L-Heg 16
L-Militarization 16
L-Nuclear war 17
L- "Space Pearl Harbor" / Eastern Threat 18
L- Satellites 19
L- Security 20
L-Space Heg 22
L- Space Tech 25
L-Space Weaponization 26
L-Surveillance 28
L-State 29 ***IMPACTS 29
Loss of Autonomy 30
Enmity Mod 31
Extinction 34
Nuclear annihilation 35
Violence 36
Securitization 38
Genocide 39 ***AT'S 39
AT: Nat Security Checks 40
A2: No L- Exploration 42
A2: No L- Science 43
Grassroots/Standpoint Trade-off 44
A2: Predictions 45
A2: Chinese ASAT Test 46 ***FRAMEWROK 46
Discourse Shapes Politics 47
A2: Realism 48 ***AFF 48
Framework 49
Alt Fails 52
Perm 54
AT: Root Cause of War 56 ***MISC. 57
Dolman Indicts 58
1NC
Power and knowledge are co-productive-while the affirmative would like you
to believe that their advantages are objective depictions of the world,
these claims are in fact contingent products of a dynamic network of power
relations-their attempt to know the world is itself an exercise of control
which must be interrogated.
Pickett 5 [Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State
College On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics pp. 10-11]
Axel Honneth, among others, points out that Foucault's conception of
power is a reworking of Nietzsche's idea of the will to power.6 Power,
in this view, is not a fixed property held by one class or group; it is
the outcome of conflict between a number of actors. It is not stable; it
is continually in flux and any truces must be considered temporary.
Power is ubiquitous in the linguistic, bureaucratic, moral, and other
structures in which agents act. For instance, although determined by
power, the fundamental rules of morality are often seen as natural
rather than contingent products of history: "It is true that it is
society that defines, in terms of its own interests, what must be
regarded as crime: it is not therefore natural. . . . [But] by assuming
the form of a natural sequence, punishment does not appear as the
arbitrary effect of human power." By revealing the origins and
historical shifts of our basic moral and cultural distinctions, it is
possible to show that what seems to be natural and self-evident is in
fact contingent and arbitrary. What appears as nature is in fact the
workings of power. Furthermore, the will to knowledge is the expression
of power. There is a battle for truth; knowledge is the spoils of
victory.9 Both Nietzsche and Foucault deny that there is a timeless, a
historical truth. Instead, truth is a thing of this world, and as such,
it is subject to the contingency, error, mendacity, and struggle that
characterize this world. Hence, Nietzsche argues that every philosophy
is an expression of the will to power of the philosopher who wrote it.10
Foucault argues that the human sciences operate on the basis of
hierarchical relations, such as those between doctor and patient, or
teacher and student, and that these sciences in turn have effects of
power.11 For these reasons, power must not be considered as an
essentially negative force, as something which is "poor in resources,
sparing of its methods, monotonous . . . incapable of invention, and
seemingly doomed always to repeat itself."12 Instead, power is capable
of producing knowledge, rules of morality, and the basic distinctions
and denotations of a language. For Nietzsche power is creative and
concerned with the continual increase in force. For Foucault, modern
power is the same: unlike power in the classical age, it is inventive
and concerned with the increase in social forces. Nietzsche and
Foucault's views of power culminate in the claim that power produces
identity. Each agent is the creation and expression of power. Both are
anti-naturalists; they deny that there is something "natural" at the
bottom of who we are. There is no fixed human nature or subjectivity.
Instead, power produces agency: it creates animals capable of, for
example, promising and confessing. A central aspect of both
philosophers' work is an attack on the philosophy of the subject, that
is, on some concept of an ahistorical metaphysical agent that is the
"doer" behind our thoughts and deeds. Instead of positing a subject
which is the foundation of all knowledge and action, philosophy should
undermine its attachment to this "subject without a history."13 We need
to see the subject as simply the outcome of the correlation of forces,
relations, and practices that constitute him. The affirmative's reliance on space technology and surveillance
internalizes, naturalizes, and shields the modern day panopticon of
satellite imagery wielded by the military-industrial complex
MacDonald 07 (October, Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master's from Oxford,
Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, "Anti-
Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography", in Progress in
Human Geography, vol 31, issue 5, proquest, IWren)
In post-Cold-War unipolar times the strategic rationale for the United
States to maintain the prohibition against weaponizing space is
diminishing (Lambakis, 2003), even if the rest of the world wishes it
otherwise. In 2000, a UN General Assembly resolution on the 'Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space' was adopted by a majority of 163-0 with 3
abstentions: the United States, Israel a n d t h e F e d e r a t e d S t
a t e s o f Mi c r o n e s i a (United Nations, 2000). Less than two
months later, a US Government committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld 5
issued a report warning that the 'relative dependence of the US on space
makes its space systems potentially attractive targets'; the United
States thus faced the danger, it argued, of a 'Space Pearl Harbor ' (Rums
feld, 2001 : vi i i ) . As spa ce warfare was, according to the report, a
'virtual certainty', the United States must 'ensure continuing
superiority' (Rumsfeld, 2001: viii). This argument was quali?ed by
obligatory gestures towards 'the peaceful use of outer space' but the
report left little doubt about the direction of American space policy.
Any dif?cult questions about the further militarization (and even
weaponization) of space could be easily avoided under the guise of
developing 'dual-use' (military/civilian) technology and emphasizing the
role of military applications in 'peacekeeping' operations. Through such
rhetoric, NATO's satellite-guided bombing of a Serbian TV station on 23
April 1999 could have been readily accommodated under the OST injunction
to use outer space for 'peaceful purposes' (Cervino et al., 2003). Since
that time new theatres of operation have been opened up in Afghani s t an
and Iraq, for further trials of space-enabled warfare that aimed to
provide aerial omniscience for the precision delivery of 'shock and awe'.
What Benjamin Lambeth has called the 'accomplishment' of air and space
power has since been called into question by the all too apparent
limitations of satellite intelligence in the tasks of identifying Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction or in stemming the growing number of Allied
dead and wounded from modestly armed urban insurgents (Lambeth, 1999;
Graham, 2004; Gregory, 2004: 205). For all its limitations, even this
imagery has been shielded from independent scrutiny by the military
monopolization of commercial satellite outputs (Livingstone and Robinson,
2003). Yet, far from undermining Allied con? dence in satellite imagery
or in a 'cosmic' view of war (Kaplan, 2006), it is precisely these
abstract photocartographies of violence - detached from their visceral
and bloodied 'accomplishments' - that have licensed, say, the destruction
of Fallujah (Gregory, 2004: 162; Graham, 2005b). There remains, of
course, a great deal more that can be said about the politics of these
aerial perspectives than can be discussed here (see, for instance,
Gregory, 2004; Kaplan, 2006). The geopolitical effects of reconnaissance
from space platforms are by no means con?ned to particular episodes of
military con?ict. Like the high-altitude spy plane, its Cold War
precursor, satellite surveillance also gives strategic and diplomatic
powers. Unlike aerial photography, however, satellite imagery is
ubiquitous and high-resolution, and offers the potential for real-time
surveillance. The emerging field of surveillance studies, strongly
informed by critical geographical thought, has opened to scrutiny the
politics and spaces of electronic observation (see, for instance, the new
journal Surveillance and Society). The writings of Foucault, particularly
those on panopticism, are an obvious in?uence on this new work (Foucault,
1977; Wood, 2003), but they have seldom been applied to the realm of
outer space. As Foucault pointed out, the power of Jeremy Bentham's
panopticon prison design is enacted through the prisoner-subjects
internalizing the disciplinary gaze: the presence of the gaoler was
immaterial, as the burden of watching was left to the watched. Similarly,
the power of panoptic orbital surveillance lies in its normalizing
geopolitical e