Space situational awareness - National Debate Coaches Association

Militarization 1nc


Obama is pursuing space cooperation - US multilateral leadership is
creating a framework against weaponization
Huntley, 11 - senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs department
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Wade, "The 2011
U.S. National Space Security Policy: Engagement as a Work in Progress",
Disarmament Times, Spring,
http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=429:the-
2011-us-national-space-security-policy-engagement-as-a-work-in-
progress&catid=154:disarmament-times-spring-2011&Itemid=2)

As is well understood, the space policies of the Bush administration were
decidedly oriented toward military security concerns and independent
action. The 2006 National Space Policy unabashedly proclaimed the U.S.
intention to maintain a dominant position in space indefinitely. This
policy orientation dismissed multilateral cooperation as impinging on U.S.
"freedom of action," throwing weight instead behind a wide range of
technology development initiatives founded on the assumption that
deployment of weapons in space was, if not already factual, certainly
inevitable.2 U.S. commercial and civil engagement was overshadowed by these
security concerns, expressed through the tightening of export control
restrictions inhibiting a broad range of technology sharing. Once again,
U.S. space policy was subsumed by other national priorities, in this case
dominated by military security concerns.
This background is essential for appreciating how the space policies of the
Obama administration are beginning to genuinely break new trails. The U.S.
National Space Policy issued in June 2010 has been widely recognized for
its cooperative and multilateral tone, including as explicit near-term
goals the expansion of international cooperation on all activities and
pursuing international as well as national measures to enhance space
stability. Particularly notable are the document's emphasis on orienting
U.S. "leadership" toward fostering international cooperation, and its
references, in its concluding section, to cooperation with other states and
non-state actors in the pursuit of national security space objectives.3
Less broadly noticed was this policy's clarity and coherence in
articulating a vision for U.S. space activities on its own terms. The
document is organized around core principles, subsidiary goals and
implementing guidelines that exceed its predecessors in delineating a
longer-term direction for U.S. space policy that is integrated with, rather
than derivative of, broader U.S. global aims.4 The policy also was
generated and issued far earlier in the tenure of the administration than
either of its predecessors, indicating an increased prioritization of
attention to space policy at higher levels of policy-making.
To some degree, a turn toward multilateral cooperation in U.S. space policy
was to be expected. China's 2007 anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the
2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision increased awareness of the challenge of space
debris and the need for better global information sharing on space
situational awareness (SSA).5 Also, new budget realities and unpromising
technological developments have scaled back ambitions in some quarters for
solving U.S. space security concerns with new independent capabilities.
Finally, the Obama administration has pursued a more cooperative
disposition across a wide range of global policy challenges, from Iranian
nuclear ambitions to global climate change. But the improved clarity of
vision in the 2010 Space Policy suggests that the emphasis on fostering
global cooperation on space-related activities is more grounded in
deliberate foresight than sailing the prevailing political winds.
The 2011 National Security Space Strategy, released February 4, is best
interpreted against this background of the Obama administration's turn
toward both greater international space cooperation and greater attention
to space policy in general. This first-of-its-kind strategic statement
culminates a congressionally mandated space posture review.6 The initial
section portraying the strategic environment to which U.S. security policy
must be responsive highlights the growing problems of space debris, orbital
congestion and coordination among a growing number of space actors - not
state-based security threats per se. The Security Space Strategy features
the objective of a "stable space environment in which nations exercise
shared responsibility."7 Specific provisions intended to implement this
strategy, relevant to the preceding observations, include:8
. The strategy presents a full section on "Partnering with Responsible
Nations, International Organizations, and Commercial Firms." This category
is not wholly multilateral in the traditional sense, displaying a symbiosis
of alliance-building and collective cooperation not always carefully
distinguished; i.e., "The United States will lead in building coalitions of
like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with
international institutions to do so."
. The strategy intends to "encourage responsible behavior in space and lead
by the power of example," a significant observation given the tendency of
U.S. policy-makers (as noted above) not to expect quid pro quo responses to
cooperative gestures. Also, the strategy states the U.S. "will support
development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-
building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations."
[italics added] In the context of the section on "Preventing and Deterring
Aggression," the strategy similarly intends to "support diplomatic efforts
to promote norms of responsible behavior in space" as well as "pursue
international partnerships that encourage potential adversary restraint,"
along with other measures. This emphasis on norm-building and the role of
example suggests a near-term endorsement of the development of "codes of
conduct" for space activities (such as the recently revised European Union
Code of Conduct, discussed below), whether or not such concord leads to
more formal arms control arrangements in the longer-term.
. The Department of Defense is directed to "foster cooperative SSA
relationships," and to "expand provision of safety of flight services to
U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms." Greater SSA
information sharing has been a key suggestion for fostering international
cooperation; the U.S. possesses globally superior SSA capabilities, but
restricts the sharing of this information on the basis of national security
concerns.9 Hence, this nominal commitment is significant in its own right.
. The strategy commits to reforming export controls. "In particular, as new
opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export
control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these
contracts." As noted above, the oppressive impact of current U.S. export
controls not only impinges on U.S. commercial space actors but also
epitomizes the high degree to which U.S. policy has subsumed commercial and
civil interests to national security concerns. The strategy appears to
acknowledge this connection and commit to remedy it.
. The most assertive passages of the statement are moderated with community-
building intent. For example, the strategy's section on "Preventing and
Deterring Aggression" concludes that the U.S. "will retain the right and
capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail," but
immediately adds that the U.S. "will use force in a manner that is
consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to
which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self
defense."
. The concluding and most conflict-oriented section of the strategy opens
by noting that "some actors may still believe counterspace actions could
provide military advantage." Counterspace capabilities, unarticulated in
the document, include ASATs, ground-based directed energy weapons and
satellite transmission jamming. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy Gregory Schulte explained at the strategy's rollout that China
is a principal concern in this regard, but so is the proliferation of these
technologies: "If Ethiopia can jam a commercial satellite, you have to
worry what others can do."10 This section of the strategy does not,
however, call for maintaining options to develop complementary space
conflict capabilities.
Rather, the strategy asserts that the U.S. "must be prepared to 'fight
through' a degraded environment," and identifies "resilience" and "space
protection" as the key criteria.
The preceding survey of elements of the 2011 National Security Space
Strategy is deliberately selective, highlighting those elements expressing
consistency with the 2010 National Space Policy's bend toward fostering
greater international collaboration. Perhaps as striking as the prevalence
of such passages, however, is the absence of expressed intention - even
couched in hedging language - to sustain or expand the kind of independent
space-based military capabilities that were the centerpiece of the prior
administration's aims (if not its accomplishments). Again, to some extent
this turn in tone is overdetermined by extenuating global circumstances.
But one must still be struck by the degree to which developments such as
the Chinese ASAT test have not ignited the kind of response one might have
anticipated only a few short years after Donald Rumsfeld's notorious
warning of a "space Pearl Harbor."11
The most immediate significance of the National Security Space Strategy is
likely the signals its sends concerning U.S. policy toward the recently
revised European Union Code of Conduct.12 The strategy did not explicitly
endorse this EU initiative, but Mr. Schulte, at the February 4 presentation
of the strategy, highlighted the initiative "as a potential way