The Project Gutenberg Etext of A Discourse on Method - CLAS Users

René Descartes
Discourse on Method (1637)
Translated by John Veitch, LL.D, from
The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes (New York, 1901): 147-
204.
Text Edited, Modified & Paginated by Dr Robert A. Hatch ©
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[148]
PREFATORY NOTE BY THE AUTHOR If this Discourse appear too long to be read at once, it may be divided
into six Parts: and, in the first, will be found various considerations
touching the Sciences; in the second, the principal rules of the Method
which the Author has discovered, in the third, certain of the rules of
Morals which he has deduced from this Method; in the fourth, the reasonings
by which he establishes the existence of God and of the Human Soul, which
are the foundations of his Metaphysic; in the fifth, the order of the
Physical questions which he has investigated, and, in particular, the
explication of the motion of the heart and of some other difficulties
pertaining to Medicine, as also the difference between the soul of man and
that of the brutes; and, in the last, what the Author believes to be
required in order to greater advancement in the investigation of Nature
than has yet been made, with the reasons that have induced him to write.
[149]
DISCOURSE ON METHOD
__________ P A R T I Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for
every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even
who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually
desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in
this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to be
held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing
truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason,
is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions,
consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of
reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts
along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects.
For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite
is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the
highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and
those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided
they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run,
forsake it. For myself, I have never fancied my mind to be in any respect more perfect
than those of the generality; on the contrary, I have often wished that I
were equal to some others in promptitude of thought, or in clearness and
distinctness of imagination, or in fullness and readiness of memory. And
besides these, I know of no other qualities that contribute to the
perfection of the mind; for as to the reason or sense, inasmuch as it is
that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes us from the brutes,
I am disposed to believe that it is to be found complete in each
individual; and on this point to [150] adopt the common opinion of
philosophers, who say that the difference of greater and less holds only
among the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of individuals of
the same species. I will not hesitate, however, to avow my belief that it has been my
singular good fortune to have very early in life fallen in with certain
tracks which have conducted me to considerations and maxims, of which I
have formed a method that gives me the means, as I think, of gradually
augmenting my knowledge, and of raising it by little and little to the
highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and the brief duration of
my life will permit me to reach. For I have already reaped from it such
fruits that, although I have been accustomed to think lowly enough of
myself, and although when I look with the eye of a philosopher at the
varied courses and pursuits of mankind at large, I find scarcely one which
does not appear in vain and useless, I nevertheless derive the highest
satisfaction from the progress I conceive myself to have already made in
the search after truth, and cannot help entertaining such expectations of
the future as to believe that if, among the occupations of men as men,
there is any one really excellent and important, it is that which I have
chosen. After all, it is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a little copper
and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds. I know how very
liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and also how much
the judgments of our friends are to be suspected when given in our favor.
But I shall endeavor in this discourse to describe the paths I have
followed, and to delineate my life as in a picture, in order that each one
may also be able to judge of them for himself, and that in the general
opinion entertained of them, as gathered from current report, I myself may
have a new help towards instruction to be added to those I have been in the
habit of employing. My present design, then, is not to teach the method which each ought to
follow for the right conduct of his reason, but solely to describe the way
in which I have endeavored to conduct my own. They who set themselves to
give precepts must of course regard themselves as possessed of greater
skill than those to whom they [151] prescribe; and if they err in the
slightest particular, they subject themselves to censure. But as this
tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as a tale, in
which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found,
perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will
prove useful to some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness
will find some favor with all. From my childhood, I have been familiar with letters; and as I was given to
believe that by their help a clear and certain knowledge of all that is
useful in life might be acquired, I was ardently desirous of instruction.
But as soon as I had finished the entire course of study, at the close of
which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, I
completely changed my opinion. For I found myself involved in so many
doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my
attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance.
And yet I was studying in one of the most celebrated schools in Europe, in
which I thought there must be learned men, if such were anywhere to be
found. I had been taught all that others learned there; and not contented
with the sciences actually taught us, I had, in addition, read all the
books that had fallen into my hands, treating of such branches as are
esteemed the most curious and rare. I knew the judgment which others had
formed of me; and I did not find that I was considered inferior to my
fellows, although there were among them some who were already marked out to
fill the places of our instructors. And, in fine, our age appeared to me
as flourishing, and as fertile in powerful minds as any preceding one. I
was thus led to take the liberty of judging of all other men by myself, and
of concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a
nature as I had previously been given to believe. I still continued, however, to hold in esteem the studies of the schools.
I was aware that the languages taught in them are necessary to the
understanding of the writings of the ancients; that the grace of fable
stirs the mind; that the memorable deeds of history elevate it; and, if
read with discretion, aid in forming the judgment; that the perusal of all
excellent books is, as it were, to interview with the noblest men of past
ages, who have written them, and even a studied interview, in which are
discovered to us only their choicest thoughts; that eloquence has
incomparable force and beauty; that poesy has its ravishing graces and
delights; that in the mathematics there are many refined discoveries
eminently suited to gratify the inquisitive, as well as further all the
arts an lessen the labour of man; that numerous highly useful precepts and
exhortations to virtue are contained in treatises on morals; that theology
points out the path to heaven; that philosophy affords the means of
discoursing with an appearance of truth on all matters, and commands the
admiration of the more simple; that jurisprudence, medicine, and the other
sciences, secure for their cultivators honors and riches; and, in fine,
that it is useful to bestow some attention upon all, even upon those
abounding the most in superstition and error, that we may be in a position
to determine their real value, and guard against being deceived. But I believed that I had already given sufficient time to languages, and
likewise to the reading of the writings of the ancients, to their histories
and fables. For to hold converse with those of other ages and to travel,
are almost the same thing. It is useful to know something of the manners
of different nations, that we may be enabled to form a more correct
judgment regarding our own, and be prevented from thinking that everything
contrary to our customs is ridiculo